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The increasing cost of electoral campaigns raises the need for effective campaign planning and a
precise understanding of the return of such investment. Interestingly, despite the strong impact
of elections on our daily lives, how this investment is translated into votes is still unknown. By
performing data analysis and modeling, we show that top candidates spend more money per vote
than the less successful and poorer candidates, a sublinearity that discloses a diseconomy of scale.
We demonstrate that such electoral diseconomy arises from the competition between candidates
due to inefficient campaign expenditure. Our approach succeeds in two important tests. First, it
reveals that the statistical pattern in the vote distribution of candidates can be explained in terms of
the independently conceived, but similarly skewed distribution of money campaign. Second, using a
heuristic argument, we are able to predict a turnout percentage for a given election of approximately
63%. This result is in good agreement with the average turnout rate obtained from real data. Due
to its generality, we expect that our approach can be applied to a wide range of problems concerning
the adoption process in marketing campaigns.
Introduction
Elections exhibit a complex process of negotiations
between politicians and voters. The past few decades
bore witness to a steep increase in the expenditure of
political campaigns. Take the example of the presi-
dential elections in the US. The 1996 campaigns cost
contestants approximately $123 million (corrected for
inflation) altogether, an amount that escalated to nearly
$2 billion in 2012 [1]. Although campaign investments
have grown, the impact of money into the electoral
outcome remains not fully understood [2–4], and conclu-
sions about it are quite contradictory. In some studies,
it has been argued that incumbent spending is ineffec-
tive, and the challenger spending, on the other hand,
produces large gains [5–7]. Other studies claim that
neither incumbent nor challenger spending makes any
appreciable difference [8, 9], a theory that dates back to
the 1940’s [10, 11]. Yet another group argues that both
challenger and incumbent spending are effective [12].
Despite the questioning about the effectiveness of po-
litical campaigns as a whole, the election campaign of
President Barack Obama in 2012 spent more than 65% of
its money on media, including TV and radio air time, dig-
ital and printing advertising, and others [13]. Therefore,
the direct contact with voters is not only a major factor
in campaign planning, but it is believed to have relevant
impact in succeeding to persuade undecided voters [14].
Here we address the problem of how campaign expen-
diture influences election outcome. We start by an exten-
sive analysis of data sets from the proportional elections
in Brazilian states for the federal and state congresses,
uncovering a ubiquitous nonlinearity on the relation be-
tween votes and campaign budget. As we will show, can-
didates can be gathered into different groups of spenders.
One group is characterized by candidates with low bud-
get campaign and a seemingly uncorrelated number of
votes. As the money invested on campaign increases, a
clear correlation between vote and money emerges. In-
terestingly, in this correlated regime, the top candidates
are those who spend more in political campaign, but with
a highly counterintuitive result: the more the candidates
spend, the less vote per dollar they get.
In Economics, a similar effect in which larger compa-
nies tend to produce goods at increased per-unit costs is
known as diseconomy of scale. Precisely, the diseconomy
of scale makes reference to a financial drawback result-
ing from the increase of the production scale. It implies
that, above a maximum efficient company size, the aver-
age cost per unit production increases. In other words,
above this maximum, the more companies invest to in-
crease in size, the less return of such investments they get
per produced unit. The origin of this type of behavior can
be manifold. For instance, it has been explained in terms
of a systematic increase in communication costs [15], or
as a consequence of the Ringelmann psychological effect,
namely, the tendency for individuals to become less ef-
ficient when working in larger groups [16]. To the best
of our knowledge, this study is the first to report the
presence of diseconomy of scale on elections.
In order to elucidate the mechanisms responsible for
this diseconomy in elections, we develop a general model
for the negotiations between candidates and voters whose
solution is compared with results from the analysis of
electoral data sets. An important assumption in our
model is that votes are considered to be “buyable”,
whether they are somehow purchased through direct
contacts between candidates and voters or, indirectly,
through media campaigns. In this way, since the amount
of financial resources mi effectively represents the main
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2convincing strength of candidate i, it also provides an
upper bound for the number of votes that can be re-
ceived, when competition among candidates is regarded
as absent. The potential ability of a candidate to acquire
votes in this model can be estimated, as a first approx-
imation, in terms of the identification of the influential
spreaders [17, 18].
A crucial goal here is to show that the competition
between candidates is the root cause of the diseconomy
of scale observed in Brazilian elections, mainly due to
the fact that, in a scenario without competition, any
model prediction will have a tendency to overestimate
the number of votes of top campaign spenders. Our
results show that the introduction of competition among
candidates in the model combined with a simple heuris-
tic argument lead to a prediction for the turnout rate
of elections that is compatible with the average value
from real data. We obtain this by the assumption that
campaign planners would make use of financial resources
considering an equitable division of funds per vote.
Results
Empirical findings
Our data analysis is based on real data sets acquired
from recent proportional elections in Brazil, publicly
available [19]. These data sets are related to the elec-
tions for the national lower house and state congress in
2014. Brazilian elections represent a quite general and
suitable case study to our purposes due to a number of
special factors. First, Brazil is a large country, both in
population and land area. It has the fifth population
of the world spread across roughly 8.5 million km2
(over 3 million mi2). Second, in contrast with executive
elections, representative elections in Brazil have a large
number of candidates. Additionally, it is compulsory to
vote in Brazil. Altogether, these factors lead to a huge
data set from a quite diverse electorate.
We start by assembling the data sets on the entire elec-
toral outcome and campaign expenditure of candidates
from all 26 Brazilian states. Figure 1 displays the num-
ber of votes v versus the declared campaign expenditure
m of each candidate for the top 4 Brazilian states in terms
of population, namely, Sa˜o Paulo (Figs. 1A and 1B), Rio
de Janeiro (Figs. 1C and 1D), Minas Gerais (Figs. 1E
and 1F ) and Bahia (Figs. 1G and 1H ). As depicted in
Fig. 1, the clouds of points are neatly correlated and
follow a clear trend. This trend is observed in all repre-
sentative elections for all Brazilian states (see Supporting
Information Section I).
To extract the main relationship between v and m, we
average the number of votes in log-spaced bins along m,
which provides an estimation for the empirical relation
of 〈v〉 as a function of m. In order to plot results for
different states in the same figure, we perform a scale
transformation on 〈v〉 by supposing simple linear rela-
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FIG. 1. Scaling relation between number of votes and
money spent. The light purple circles show the relation be-
tween the number of votes and the declared campaign expen-
diture of each candidate in the state (SD) and federal deputies
(FD) elections in 2014 for the four largest states in Brazil:
Sa˜o Paulo (A, B), Rio de Janeiro (C, D), Minas Gerais (E,
F ), and Bahia (G, H ). Despite the large fluctuations, there
is an unambiguous correlation between votes and money. In
each panel, the data for elected candidates are highlighted in
dark purple circles. In order to see the nuances of the corre-
lation, we plotted in a normalized relation for (I ) state and
(J ) federal deputies for the eight largest states in Brazil. The
symbols represent the normalized ratio 〈v〉∆m/m, where we
first calculate the average number of votes in log-spaced bins
along m. If we assume a linear correlation, the multiplica-
tive constant is ∆m = M/n. The normalization provides us
a direct observation of the nonlinearity in the dependence of
votes on money. We see a global sublinear behavior, where
the wealthier candidates display a lower fraction of votes per
money.
tion 〈v〉 = c×m, where c is a characteristic constant of a
given election. If we define the average price of a vote as
∆m =
∑
imi/
∑
i vi and suppose that it is roughly uni-
form across candidates, it is easy to see that c = 1/∆m.
Here, vi is the number of votes of candidates i. If the
relation between votes and money is linear, then the plot
of 〈v〉×(∆m/m) should be a constant function of m with
value close to 1.0.
In Figs. 1I and 1J, we plot 〈v〉∆m/m as a function of
m for the state legislative assembly and federal congress
elections, respectively, for the year of 2014 and for the
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FIG. 2. Model’s pictorial sketch. Here, two candidates compete for votes in a social network with undecided (light gray)
individuals. (A) The blue candidate has initially a budget of 4 (four) monetary units, while the campaign for the red candidate
has a budget of 2 (two) monetary units. In this example, both candidates also has one decided voter at the beginning of
the process, namely, the blue voter at the top part of the network and the red one at the bottom part of the network. The
highlighted regions enclose the initial voter each campaign has and the acquaintances of each initial voter. These regions
represent operational areas the campaigns will act at the next time step in order to convince undecided voters to vote for
their associated candidates. (B) One undecided voter inside each operational area is randomly chosen, becoming then decided
voters. Accordingly, each budget campaign decreases by the amount of ∆m = $. As a consequence of new decided voters,
the operational areas grow, and since two acquaintances become voters of different candidates, the operational areas of the
campaigns now overlap. This region where both campaigns can act is represented in yellow. (C ) While the red candidate’s
campaign chose an undecided voter, increasing its operational area, blue campaign ineffectively spends money on a decided
voter. (D) At the end of the campaign process, when all campaigns run out of funds, the campaign with larger initial budget
ends the process with more adopters, but his/her campaign is less efficient, resulting in a diseconomy of scale.
eight most populated states in Brazil. The result shows
a consistent nontrivial dependence of votes on money
spent in campaign. For small values of m, we observe
a rapidly decrease of 〈v〉∆m/m. For intermediate
expenditures in the range R$10,000 < m < R$100,0001,
we observe an apparent linear dependence of v with
respect to m. Finally, for m > R$100,000, a noticeable
departure from linearity is observed, that is, wealthier
candidates need a disproportionately large amount of
money to obtain a single vote as compared with less
successful candidates within the same range of financial
resources.
A general model for the price of a vote
Here, we propose a general model for the price of a vote.
We consider an electoral process composed of two sep-
arate groups of individuals, candidates and voters. All
s candidates can compete for the vote of all n voters,
and each candidate i has a limited amount of money mi
to spend on their campaigns. Thus, if at a given time
mi = 0, the candidate becomes unable to compete for
voters anymore. Here we assume that candidates can
only conquer a single vote at a given time step and that
voters, once they reach a decision, cannot change their
minds anymore. As compared to the case of plurality
1 At election day, October 5th, 2014, the exchange rate between
the Dollar and the Brazilian Real was R$ 2.4266 = $1.
elections, the last assumption is readily justifiable for pro-
portional elections since, in this case, candidates do not
compete directly for the same seat. As a consequence,
voters do not feel compelled to rethink their decisions.
In this way, because it is not possible to know if a voter
reached a decision or not, campaigns can spend money
on already decided voters, leading to ineffective use of
financial resources.
A pictorial description of the model is presented in
Fig. 2. On a social network with undecided voters, rep-
resented by light gray individuals, two candidates start
their campaigns with an initial amount of money m and
one single decided voter. This initial seed is represented
in Fig. 2A by the blue and red individuals. The regions
highlighted in blue and red represent the operational ar-
eas of the campaigns, enclosing the group of voters to
whom the campaigns will spend money in order to turn
undecided voters into decided voters. As depicted in
Fig. 2B, at each time step each campaign chooses one
voter inside its operational areas. If the chosen individual
is an undecided voter, she/he becomes a decided voter.
Accordingly, the overall campaign money is decreased by
an amount of ∆m. If the chosen voter is already a de-
cided voter, as depicted in Fig. 2C, the campaign budget
is also decreased by ∆m, but the voter’s decision remains
unchanged. We repeat this procedure until all campaigns
run out of funds. In Fig 2D, we show a typical example
of a competition for votes between two candidates during
the electoral process described by our model. Although
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FIG. 3. Modelling the nonlinear scaling. In order to verify if our model correctly fits the data, we show in (A) and (B) the
Sa˜o Paulo election for state and federal deputies in 2014, respectively. Each light purple circle corresponds to one candidate
and the dark purples circles are the average number of votes in log-spaced bins along m. We see that our model shows a good
agreement with the average behavior for all the money spectrum. In (C ) and (D) we perform the same normalization process
as in Fig. 2 but now with ∆m is estimated using Eq. 3. Each solid line shows the solution of our model. Despite its simplicity,
our model features all nonlinear regimes seen in the data, which corroborates our theory that the inefficiency of wealthier
candidates are mainly due to competition.
the candidate with the larger initial budget receives more
votes at the end of the election, due to ineffective spend-
ing, the campaign of the poorer candidate is, in fact,
more efficient.
In order to represent the reach of the traditional and
social medias, as a first approximation, we apply this
model on a complete graph, so that the time evolution of
the number of votes of a given candidate i can be written
as
dvi
dt
=
(
1− S(t)
n
)
[mi(t) > 0], (1)
where S(t) =
∑s
i=0 vi is the total number of decided
voters at time t, and [mi(t) > 0] is the Iverson bracket,
which is 1 if the condition inside the brackets is satisfied,
and 0 otherwise. The right-hand side of the Eq. 1 is the
probability of candidate i to choose an undecided voter
at time t. Equation 1 explicitly requires a definition for
the rate of money expenditure, dmi/dt, which determines
the gradual decrease in financial resources of candidate i.
As simplifying assumptions, we consider that the amount
of money spent during the campaign decreases linearly,
dmi/dt = −∆mi, and that this constant rate is the same
for all candidates, ∆mi = ∆m, ∀i.
The probabilistic feature of Eq. 1 is central to con-
firm our hypothesis that electoral outcome is an output
of campaign expenditure due to a competition process.
This is shown here by first considering the case with-
out competition, where s  n. Also, we assume that
n∆m  mi for all i, so that the candidate with the
highest amount of funds do not have enough money to
reach out the whole network. By doing so, it is unlikely
that the extent of the candidates’ campaigns overlap, and
therefore, a candidate would not waste her/his campaign
money on a decided voter of another candidate. As a con-
sequence, since the probability of candidate i to conquer
an undecided voter is not affected by another campaign,
S(t) can be replaced by vi in Eq. 1, leading to an un-
coupled system of differential equations, whose solution
is given by,
vi = n− (n− v0,i)e−mi/n∆m, (2)
where v0,i is the initial number of votes of candidate i.
Since n∆m  mi, and assuming that (n − v0,i) ≈ n,
by expanding the exponential and taking its first or-
der approximation, we can write the number of votes
as vi ≈ v0,i + mi/∆m . As we discuss next, this sim-
ple model do not suffice to explain the whole complexity
of the relation between v and m. The first two regimes
presented in Fig. 2 can be understood in therms of this
approximation. For the regime of low m, where the ex-
perimental data do not exhibit a clear correlation, the
candidates start the race with v0,i votes. Since they can-
not afford a long run and/or a large expenditure, their
final performance fluctuates around the initial value v0,i,
which depends on different factors, such as free volun-
5teer engagement. As campaign money increases, the lin-
ear part overcomes the initial number v0,i, and a linear
regime emerges. However, in the scenario without com-
petition, the linear behavior remains at large m.
We now consider the competition between candidates
as a possible cause for the transition from linear to sub-
linear regime. Disregarding all previous simplifying as-
sumptions and integrating Eq. 1, we find
vi = v0,i +
mi
∆m
− 1
n∆m
∫ mi
0
S(m′)dm′, (3)
where the integration of the Iverson bracket over time
gives the total time candidate i has to perform her/his
campaign, mi/∆m, and we used dm
′/dt′ = −∆m to
change the variable of integration on the last term.
It is possible to find a differential equation for S(m′)
by taking Eq. 1 and summing over i. After solving it for
S(m′) and integrating the last term of Eq. 3 (see Sup-
porting Information Section II for details of the analytical
solution), we find a set of nonlinear coupled equations
that must be solved, candidate by candidate, following
an increasing order of mi values. As a consequence, the
number of votes of candidate i depends on the whole dis-
tribution P (m) through the integral term in Eq. 3.
Equation 3 has a simple interpretation. As in the
case without competition, all candidates begin their run
with an initial number of votes, and those with suffi-
cient money to keep running enter in a linear regime
controlled by the rate ∆m/m. Nonetheless, as we will
see next, candidates with sufficient campaign funds may
start to waste their money on decided voters, a behavior
that is substantiated by the presence of S(m′) in the last
term of Eq. 3, which encloses the competition dynamics.
We consider this collective influence of the total financial
resources from all candidates during the campaign as an
important result, since it provides a bridge between cam-
paign expenditure and electoral outcome, which is the
basis of the remaining results that follows.
In order to obtain a solution for the model, we use as
inputs the money mi of each candidate i, obtained from
data, the total number of voters n, an initial number of
votes v0, and an estimated value for ∆m. For all can-
didates, we define v0 as the average number of votes of
candidates with less then R$1,000. The parameter ∆m
is calculated as a function of the turnout rate T = Sf/n,
where Sf = limt→∞ S(t) is the total number of votes at
steady state. We can therefore write the final fraction of
votes as
T = 1− e−M/(n∆m), (4)
where M =
∑
imi is the total amount of money in the
campaign process. Therefore, we estimate ∆m using
Eq. 4 such that the total number of votes fits the turnout
election data.
The results of the election in Sa˜o Paulo state for
state and federal deputies in 2014 are shown in Figs. 3A
and 3B, respectively. As depicted, the predictions of our
model (solid line) are in good agreement with the aver-
age values of the number of votes for different classes of
candidates in terms of fund raising. Note that no fit-
ting parameters are necessary for this comparison. For
m < R$1,000, our model exhibits a constant behavior,
capturing the uncorrelated nature of the data. Addition-
ally, for m > R$1,000, an evident correlation between
votes and money is present. This is better visualized
when we plot in Figs. 3C and 3D the normalized ratio
〈v〉∆m/m for the eight most populated Brazilian states.
Here, the symbols represent the data average and the
lines show the solution of our model for each state iden-
tified by color. For small and large values of m, we see
that our model exhibits a clear deviation from a linear
behavior. In other words, besides exhibiting this devia-
tion for m < R$1,000, a clear sublinearity is present for
m > R$100,000. Under the perspective of our model, the
observed diseconomy of scale is a direct consequence of
the competition among candidates (see Supporting Infor-
mation Section III for a statistical comparison between
our model with competition and the linear model without
competition).
Social networks are known to display the small-world
phenomenon, where the typical network distance be-
tween two individuals, `, is rather small when compared
to the system size, ` ∼ logN [20, 21]. Our analytical
solution on a complete graph works as a first approx-
imation of such complex social network structure. In
order to compare our model with a more realistic one,
we apply the dynamics presented on Fig. 2 on a random
graph [21] (see Supporting Information Section IV).
We found a good agreement between the solution on
a complete graph model and the numerical simulation
results obtained with a random graph model.
Frequency distribution of votes
One of the first empirical investigations concerning
Brazilian elections was carried out to determine the
distribution P (v) of the number of candidates receiving
v votes [22–25]. Since then, several other studies have
been devoted to elucidate the origin of the anomalous
behaviors of P (v) for other countries as well as to
propose mathematical models that can provide some
insight on the social and political mechanisms respon-
sible for this statistical behavior [24, 26, 27]. In our
modeling approach, however, the distribution of votes
emerges as a natural outcome of the distribution of
financial resources P (m). As shown in Fig. 4A, the
distribution P (m) calculated for state deputies of three
different states in Brazil can all be described in terms
of a power-law type of decay extending over a region
of approximately six orders of magnitude. Using those
distributions as inputs, we determine P (v) for each one
of those elections. In Fig. 4B we compare the empirical
votes distribution for the state of Sa˜o Paulo with the
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FIG. 4. Analytical results of the model. In order to derive the distribution of votes, our model takes as input the
distribution of money. (A) We see that the distributions of money for the state deputies in Sa˜o Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro
(RJ) and Minas Gerais (MG) reveal long tails characteristic. (B) We can now compare the actual distribution (circles) of votes,
P (v), with the ones obtained by our model (squares) for the election of state representatives in Sa˜o Paulo. Clearly, we can
see that our model have a good agreement with the data showing that the universal long tail characteristic of P (v) is a direct
consequence of the money as an input for dynamical competition process. (C ) Relative difference between the cumulative
distributions of the predictions for the model with and without competition. Here we show the results for the elections of
state deputies (SD) and federal deputies (FD) for Sa˜o Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Minas Gerais (MG). No noticeable
difference between both approaches can be observed for the region of m < R$10, 000. However, for the region of top spenders
candidates (m > R$1, 000, 00), those who get elected, the relative difference is drastic, varying from 30% to 40%. (D) By
solving our model, as expressed in Eq. 1, we calculate the expected number of votes that each candidate should have for an
election. The total number of votes of that election divided by the number of voters n is defined as the turnout ratio T . For
all 56 parliamentary elections in 2014, we compared our estimation of the turnout ratio, Tmodel, and the data ratio Tdata. The
dashed line represents what would be the perfect agreement, Treal = Tmodel. As can be seen, the simulations (circles) exhibit a
good agreement with the data. (E) We can also pick up the candidate with the largest number of votes vmax and see how our
model estimates this value. As depicted, we see that the competition model (circles) better estimates vmax when compared with
the linear model (squares), which always overestimates it. The non-parametric histogram of T shown in (F ) for the election of
2006, 2010, and 2014 reveals an average turnout value of approximately 67 which is consistent with our heuristic estimation of
T = 1− e−1 ≈ 63% (vertical dashed line).
one obtained by our model, which reproduces correctly
the empirical distribution of votes among candidates,
P (v), for over two orders of magnitude (see Supporting
Information Sec. V for results concerning the states of
Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais). This implies that the
observed non-Gaussian long tail form has its origin in
the heterogeneous aspect of the distribution of campaign
resources, regardless of the intricate social network and
information dynamics behind the electoral process.
Model validation
To highlight the effect of the sublinearity on forecasting
an election, we compute the relative difference between
the cumulative vote distribution predicted by the linear
model without competition and the one predicted by the
model with competition. As shown in Fig. 4C, for state
congress election in the top three populated Brazilian
states, namely, Sa˜o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas
Gerais, no significant difference is noticed between the
two predictions for campaigns of low expenditure. How-
ever, for electoral campaigns that invested more than
R$10, 000, a substantial discrepancy between predictions
can be noticed. For this region of top spenders, the cu-
mulative difference can be drastic, going above 30% in
some cases.
We confirm the validity of our model by comparison
7with data from the 2014 state and federal deputy elec-
tions that took place simultaneously in the 26 states of
Brazil. As shown in Fig. 4D, where each point corre-
sponds to an election in a given state, the model results
for the turnout rate T , as provided by Eq. 4, are compat-
ible with the observed data. This agreement only con-
firms the self-consistency of our approach, since Eq. 3
has been used to estimate the parameter ∆m. The pre-
dictive capability of the model can be effectively tested
by comparing its estimate with real data for the largest
number of votes obtained by a candidate in each election,
vmax. As shown in Fig. 4E, while the results of our model
(circles) gather around the identity line, demonstrating
good quantitative agreement with real data, the linear
approximation model, vmax ≈ v0 +mmax/∆m (squares),
clearly overestimates the values of vmax.
At this point, we show that our theoretical framework
allows for a forecast of the turnout ratio T , if the
following assumptions are considered: (i) the candidates
have knowledge of the total amount of resources M
during the campaign, and (ii) ∆m = M/n, which
corresponds to the most simple and equitable division of
votes. As matter of fact, this last point is equivalent to
assume that a complete turnout can be achieved, namely,
T = 100%, as in the case without competition. In other
words, the candidates devise their strategy presupposing
that they will obtain the maximum possible number
of votes, therefore disregarding the competition among
them. This heuristic argument leads to a fraction of
valid votes, T = 1 − e−1 ≈ 0.63. As shown in Fig. 4F,
the histogram of the number of total valid votes for all
Congress elections in the years 2006, 2010 and 2014
indicates an average turnout value of 0.67, which is in
close agreement with our model prediction. Finally, we
also tested our theoretical approach by applying the
principle of maximum entropy [28] and found that the
statistical dispersion of the model is consistent with real
data from elections (see Supporting Information Sec.
VI).
Discussion
As a result of the competition between candidates
in real elections, the nonlinear relation between v and m
obtained here can complement other statistical analyses
for political campaign and electoral outcome [29–32].
These analyses enable the detection of a number of
statistical patterns of electoral processes, such as the re-
lations between party size and temporal correlations [33],
the relations between the number of candidates and
voters [34], and the distribution of votes [22, 26, 27, 35].
Our approach goes beyond the examination of statistical
patterns by providing a theoretical framework that
clarifies a number of key issues on the economical
features of electoral campaigns. First, we proposed a
simple modeling framework, whose analytical solution
is statistically consistent with extensive data relating
financial resources of political and electoral outcomes.
Interestingly, the same model also provides estimates
for the distribution of votes among candidates and the
electorate turnout rate that are in good agreement with
real data.
A close inspection of the campaign data investigated
here reveals a ubiquitous nontrivial relation between v
and m for all elections investigated. More precisely, we
observed that this relation is an unambiguous sublinear
correlation between the money spent by candidate and
her/his number of votes v, specially for the top spender
candidates, indicating that the electoral process works in
a state of diseconomy of scale. To explain this behavior
in the campaign economy, we propose a general model for
marketing where candidates compete with each other and
must spend their money in order to get votes. Despite
its simplicity, the model proves capable of reproducing
the complexity of the dependence of v with respect of
m. This good agreement makes our model a possible
alternative to study other aspects of human collective
behavior involving, for example, diffusion of innovation
and decision-making, such as the competition in market
share where companies invest in advertising for products.
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THE DATA
Data Description
In the main text we investigate the effect of the investment of candidates on campaign thanks to the available data
containing the total donation received by and the expenses of each candidate. We analyze Brazilian elections for two
different kinds of legislators, more specifically, the federal and state deputies. Their function is to legislate in the
unicameral system of each Brazilian state. The federal deputies are representatives in the chamber of deputies of the
national Congress. They are also elected for a four year term by a proportional system. The number of elected federal
deputies is proportional to the population of each one of the 26 states. The data is available at the website of the
Brazilian Federal Electoral Court [S1]. By force of law, each candidate must provide a detailed description of his/her
campaign expenditure with specific informations such as the value, date and type of expense. All this information can
be accessed by the public, however in order to know the total cost of the campaign and the number of votes of each
candidate, it is necessary to process the database computationally. In Tables I and II, we show a detailed description
of the data for each state. State deputies are local representatives elected for a four year term by a proportional
system.
Results for all States
Here we summarize the results of our model for the election in 2014 of state and federal deputies in each Brazilian
state. Figure S1 shows the data obtained for state deputies election and Fig. S2 shows data for the federal deputies
election.
ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
Calculation of the expected turnout rate T
Following from Eq. (1) in the main text and summing over i, we can find a differential equation for the decided
number of voters S, which reads
dS
dt
=
(
1− S(t)
n
)
r(t), (S1)
where n is the total number of voters, and r(t) =
∑
i[mi(t) > 0] is the number of candidates who still have money at
instant t, which depends solely on the distribution of money. After integrating Eq. (S1), we find that
S(t) = n− (n− S(0)) exp
(
− 1
n
∫ t
0
r(t′)dt′
)
. (S2)
This equation enables us to compute the expected turnout rate T of the election as a function of the average price of
a vote ∆m, the total money M , and n. To compute T , it is necessary to take the limit t→∞, first. At this limit, we
are able to compute the value where S saturates. Then, we can define T as
T =
1
n
lim
t→∞S(t). (S3)
In order to compute the integral in Eq. (S2) at this limit, we recall from the main text that dt = −dm/∆m. Then,
the integral becomes
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
r(t′)dt′ =
∫ ∞
0
Nc∑
i=0
[mi(m
′) > 0]dm′/∆m, (S4)
2where Nc is the total number of candidates. After commutating the summation with the integral, and integrating the
Iverson’s bracket over m′, we find that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
r(t′)dt′ =
M
∆m
, (S5)
which leads to
T = 1− e−M/(n∆m). (S6)
Figure S4A shows the turnout rate T as a function of ∆m computed from Eq. (S6) for the model with competition,
and for the model without competition (Tlinear). The number of votes (or money) lost by competition can be evaluated
by looking at the difference between T and Tlinear. We see that there is a maximum loss when ∆m = M/n.
Calculation of the expected number of votes v
By integrating Eq. (1) from the main text and performing a change of variables, we find that vi can be written as
a function of mi as
vi = vi(0) +
mi
∆m
− 1
∆m
∫ mi
0
S(m′)
n
dm′. (S7)
Using Eq. (S2), we can rewrite the above equation as
vi = vi(0) +
1
∆m
(
1− S(0)
n
)∫ mi
0
exp
[
− 1
n∆m
∫ m′
0
r(m′′)dm′′
]
dm′. (S8)
To find an analytical expression for v, we first decompose the external integral as
vi = vi(0) +
1
∆m
(
1− S(0)
n
)∫ mi−1
0
exp
[
− 1
n∆m
∫ m′
0
r(m′′)dm′′
]
dm′
+
1
∆m
(
1− S(0)
n
)∫ mi
mi−1
exp
[
− 1
n∆m
∫ m′
0
r(m′′)dm′′
]
dm′,
(S9)
that compared with Eq. (S8) can be rewritten as
vi = vi(0)− vi−1(0) + vi−1
+
1
∆m
(
1− S(0)
n
)∫ mi
mi−1
exp
[
− 1
n∆m
∫ m′
0
r(m′′)dm′′
]
dm′.
(S10)
The result of this integral relies on the limits of the external integral. Using the definition of r(m) for the external
interval m′ ∈ [mi−1,mi], we find that∫ m′
0
r(m′′)dm′′ = m0 +m1 +m2 + ...+mi−1 + (Nc − i)m′. (S11)
By solving the integrals, we finally find that the number of votes vi is given by
vi = vi(0)− vi−1(0) + vi−1
− n− S(0)
Nc − i e
−∑i−1j=0 mj/(n∆m) [e− (Nc−i)min∆m − e− (Nc−i)mi−1n∆m ] . (S12)
As we can see from Eq. (S12), the number of votes vi of a candidate i is not only a function of his budget mi, but
also depends on the whole distribution P (m). In Fig. S4B we show how v(m) changes with ∆m. As ∆m decreases,
a large fraction of the voters become decided (i.e., T → 1), and v(m) displays a saturation for larges values of m
resulting on the diseconomy of scale due to the competition between candidates.
3STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF MODELS
In order to compare our model with the simple case without competition, we make use of the Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC) [S2]. The AIC is a model selection method that uses information theory to compare the relative
estimation of the information lost by mathematical models used to generate data. Here, we used AIC to measure the
relative quality of our model when compared with the linear non-competitive model. Suppose that we have a model
with P parameters that fits a data set with N points. Then, the AIC is defined as
AIC = N ln
(
RSS
N
)
+ 2(P + 1), (S13)
where RSS is the residual sum of squares given by
RSS =
N∑
i=1
(xi −Xi)2. (S14)
Here, xi is the i
th value of the variable to be predicted and the Xi is the predicted value of xi. We calculate the
AIC for each model using Eq. (S13). Then, by Akaike’s criterion, the preferred model is the one with the minimum
AIC value. Here, we label the model without competition as WOC and the more complex model, where there is
competition, as WC. The difference in AIC is then defined as ∆AIC = AICWC − AICWOC. Once this difference is
computed we calculate the probability that model WC minimize the information loss:
PWC =
e−0.5∆AIC
1− e−0.5∆AIC . (S15)
Therefore, the probability that model WOC minimizes the information loss is PWOC = 1− PWC. Here, we define the
ratio between PWC and PWOC as the evidence ratio, which means how many times the model WC is more likely to
minimize the information loss. We then performed this analysis for federal and state deputies for the 2014 elections
in all 26 Brazilian states. The model WC and the model WOC are compared to the logarithm of the data (Tables III
and IV), and to the data without applying the logarithm (Tables V, and VI). The AIC shows that the model with
competition best explains the data when compared to the linear model in all studied cases.
SIMULATION ON A COMPLEX NETWORK
In order to solve analytically the model, we make use of a mean field approximation where the network is a fully
connected graph. To see if our solution still holds for a more complex topology, we performed simulations using the
Erdo¨s–Re´nyi network model with three different values for the average degree: 〈k〉 = 2, 6 and 10. As we can see in
Fig. S3A and B, for federal and state deputies, respectively, we find a good agreement between the analytical solution
(black line) and the real data (grey circles) for 〈k〉 = 6 and 10. Due to computational performance, we chose the state
of Esp´ırito Santo to perform the simulations. First, we made use of the candidates’ budget for the 2014 election as an
input for the distribution of money P (m). The network size is taken from the number of registered voters in Esp´ırito
Santo, N = 2653536, as presented in Table 1 and 2. Each candidate starts the simulation with only one node as a
decided voter. This node is the initial seed for the candidate’s marketing campaing. The overall underestimation of
the number of votes for 〈k〉 = 2 can be understood by noting that an important fraction of the network is made of
unconnected nodes, therefore, for the candidates with seeds in the largest cluster the network seems to be smaller.
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES
Here, we show the comparison between the empirical votes distribution for the states of Rio de Janeiro (Fig. S5a)
and Minas Gerais (Fig. S5B) with the one obtained by our model. Again, the model reproduces correctly the empirical
distribution of votes among candidates, P (v).
STUDY OF THE DISPERSION
Our model allow us to calculate the mean or expected value of the number of votes. However, to fully describe
the election we have also to study the statistical dispersion, which is given by the conditional probability distribution
4p(v|m). We can use the concept of maximum entropy probability distribution (MaxEnt) from information theory to
guess which is the p(v|m) that maximizes the Shannon’s Entropy [S3]. Imposing only a constraint for the mean 〈v〉,
the maximum entropy continuous distribution is exponential,
p(v|m) = 1〈v〉e
− v〈v〉 , (S16)
which has the property that the mean and standard deviation are the same. We see in Figure S6A that our data show
a close linear relationship with approximately unit slope σ ≈ 〈v〉, which strongly indicates that the Eq. (S16) accounts
for all the random variation on v(m) with the expected value calculated by our model. In the inset of Fig. 4F from
the main text, we show these two elements in a simulation for the election of state deputy for the state of Sa˜o Paulo,
the greatest electoral college in Brazil. Figure S6B shows that the addition of random dispersion to our model leads
to a remarkable resemblance with real election data.
∗ Corresponding author: hygor.piaget@gmail.com
[S1] http://www.tse.gov.br/
[S2] Motulskuy H, Christopoulos A (2004) Fitting models to biological data using linear and nonlinear regression: a practical
guide to curve fitting (Oxford University Press)
[S3] Jaynes ET (1957) Information theory and statistical mechanics. Phys. Rev. 106(4):620.
5Federal deputies
State n M (R$) Sf T (%) r–pearson p–value
AC 506724 8480357.97 368332 72.6888799425 0.722748043319 3.30192976139e-11
AL 1995727 18421969.9 1283120 64.2933627696 0.840392141284 4.92302048603e-31
AM 2226891 23414726.56 1560085 70.0566395032 0.905459637663 9.23656309525e-31
AP 455514 8484530.19 368061 80.8012486993 0.566853357973 1.31431785604e-10
BA 10185417 72471496.94 5982371 58.7346693807 0.698084305668 2.28399775277e-49
CE 6271554 34838910.83 4002492 63.819780552 0.737909089987 7.95861881821e-36
ES 2653536 19490814.39 1665277 62.7569024879 0.822155443552 1.7418221573e-41
GO 4331733 65145051.12 2824329 65.2009022717 0.66788295422 6.05466767683e-20
MA 4497336 21197635.67 2836788 63.0770749617 0.685587130132 8.36126780457e-35
MG 15248681 160498695.1 9273472 60.8149124505 0.806652645383 1.27631105412e-147
MS 1818937 29384486.15 1174221 64.5553419387 0.778880439738 1.8509184753e-25
MT 2189703 27179850.24 1334861 60.9608243675 0.86687644675 1.61425424251e-33
PA 5188450 19219663.68 3496764 67.3951565496 0.714596611048 4.68308734801e-30
PB 2835882 14092397.88 1773112 62.5241811895 0.855261326688 2.61029697443e-30
PE 6356307 51507676.68 4129147 64.9614154886 0.728324391535 1.46267253887e-27
PI 2345694 24898627.07 1587477 67.6762186372 0.656433873665 1.22040618126e-13
PR 7865950 69592048.16 5275880 67.0723815941 0.728660777076 6.64008626188e-52
RJ 12141145 110784215.29 7063961 58.1820001326 0.56473987424 2.1291171572e-85
RN 2327451 14178893.28 1451341 62.3575319094 0.882530044098 1.40216619215e-30
RO 1127154 16967025.91 740924 65.7340523123 0.683327785935 7.96683605323e-13
RR 299558 8358613.48 225631 75.3213067252 0.598924952323 3.49851465097e-09
RS 8392033 57254432.25 5501353 65.554472915 0.836559267138 4.74667303986e-84
SC 4859324 31716424.53 3120297 64.2125736008 0.869812045153 2.11886214421e-41
SE 1454165 8057895.72 974311 67.0014063053 0.684912931565 2.44474497848e-12
TO 996887 15619685.1 670894 67.2989014803 0.76979251044 1.60978392322e-10
SP 31998432 241919492.64 19072393 59.6041487283 0.483246969693 9.81028340891e-81
TABLE I. Data description for Federal deputies. Here we describe the main properties of the data for the federal deputies
election from all Brazilian states. For each state we show the number of voters registered n, the total cost of the campaign in
Brazilian Reais (R$) M , the number of valid votes Sf , and the turnout percentage T .
6State deputies
State n M (R$) Sf T (%) r–pearson p–value
AC 506724 10656037.7 377299 74.4584823296 0.803577951964 1.59880493578e-114
AL 1995727 19627276.99 1314659 65.8736891368 0.836240190525 8.11032735735e-76
AM 2226891 28001756.68 1547128 69.4747969254 0.498718455137 4.12728400638e-39
AP 455514 5626676.58 373731 82.0459963909 0.647712202199 7.66012489633e-44
BA 10185417 47294333.36 6053428 59.432304048 0.782568469296 1.25445144149e-126
CE 6271554 32576249.09 4095292 65.2994776095 0.686934485759 7.21069456863e-83
ES 2653536 23289124.65 1748232 65.8831084259 0.741623876986 4.30172166816e-85
GO 4331733 79310623.34 2882804 66.550823885 0.734121134203 3.1534575998e-129
MA 4497336 25979148.94 2917772 64.8777854268 0.839414632196 1.67610556861e-134
MG 15248681 177676580.98 9283721 60.8821248212 0.224029765254 4.52706918339e-14
MS 1818937 45948066.57 1204007 66.1928917824 0.799004169269 6.08398880781e-90
MT 2189703 51639423.61 1375357 62.8102075944 0.771404926583 2.02454597864e-62
PA 5188450 31595425.94 3453031 66.5522651274 0.715064099361 1.78371156902e-110
PB 2835882 17219860.72 1835376 64.7197591437 0.782772014141 1.67491078919e-74
PE 6356307 40641680.29 4171737 65.6314586441 0.748176330675 1.36075786856e-90
PI 2345694 20320016.99 1607165 68.5155438007 0.816180285209 2.19894569952e-58
PR 7865950 61749634.55 5298846 67.3643488708 0.878519254427 1.18750225791e-247
RJ 12141145 130048101.34 7122375 58.6631244417 0.572037787678 5.93043422869e-167
RN 2327451 18343797.5 1529149 65.700588326 0.850127492405 3.79357570719e-72
RO 1127154 25138956.64 761590 67.5675196113 0.741913371628 3.21262552227e-70
RR 299558 13376926.76 242398 80.9185533352 0.813681589893 8.41908443078e-96
RS 8392033 54552702.15 5592657 66.6424571972 0.691245148201 3.6535374402e-98
SC 4859324 52245781.28 3280653 67.5125387811 0.816495812077 1.75144104038e-102
SE 1454165 8833829.91 967550 66.5364659444 0.716103939585 1.17133851209e-28
TO 996887 20185053.82 699008 70.1190806982 0.864802148991 1.46231152842e-78
SP 31998432 231516634.41 17618073 55.0591760246 0.722245302764 1.00059011444e-314
TABLE II. Data description for State deputies. Here we describe the main properties of the data for the state deputies
election from all Brazilian states. For each state we show the number of voters registered n, the total cost of the campaign in
Brazilian Reais (R$) M , the number of valid votes Sf , and the turnout percentage T .
7Federal deputies
State ∆ AIC Probability WOC Probability WC Evidence radio
AC 6.1827384262 0.0434646736 0.9565353264 22.0071898888
AL 4.7608349884 0.0846782011 0.9153217989 10.8094147898
AM 2.6647303199 0.2087684091 0.7912315909 3.7899967439
AP 2.806065353 0.1973353125 0.8026646875 4.0675167435
CE 10.5123485714 0.0051881611 0.9948118389 191.7465189
ES 14.4468382526 0.0007287731 0.9992712269 1371.1692559
GO 7.4677125018 0.0233425922 0.9766574078 41.8401435584
MA 7.7592626578 0.0202403068 0.9797596932 48.4063657539
MS 10.1109475602 0.0063339711 0.9936660289 156.878838813
MT 3.9037010608 0.1243517168 0.8756482832 7.0417064229
PA 9.663695483 0.0079087312 0.9920912688 125.442532017
PB 4.6657768971 0.0884355349 0.9115644651 10.3076717549
PI 2.3415470513 0.2367151943 0.7632848057 3.2244858966
RN 5.1455026334 0.0709128217 0.9290871783 13.1018221599
RO 9.807097669 0.0073655493 0.9926344507 134.767198525
RR 1.8879845033 0.2800946322 0.7199053678 2.5702219362
SC 13.3469679287 0.0012623917 0.9987376083 791.147136976
SE 2.8635043257 0.1928258238 0.8071741762 4.1860273715
TO 5.8040508651 0.0520535295 0.9479464705 18.2109931789
BA 16.0404485774 0.0003286382 0.9996713618 3041.85951117
MG 32.2756994687 9.80439653939e-08 0.999999902 10199504.8644
SP 74.5043113536 6.63123395728e-17 1 1.50801495837e+16
RJ 42.5533963117 5.74972928891e-10 0.9999999994 1739212316.23
RS 18.8727293265 7.97635097082e-05 0.9999202365 12536.0611657
PE 7.192496085 0.026694303 0.973305697 36.4611767018
PR 15.899933541 0.0003525495 0.9996474505 2835.48072726
TABLE III. Statistical comparison between the models. We use the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to compare the
two models: WOC (without competition) and WC (with competition). The AIC lets us determine which model is more likely
to describe correctly the data and quantify by calculating the probabilities and an evidence radio. The probability column
shows the likelihood of each model to be the most correctly. The evidence radio is the fraction of Probability WC by Probability
WOC, which means how many times model WC is likely to be correct than model WOC. Here, the AIC was applied in the
logarithm of the data.
8States deputies
State ∆ AIC Probability WOC Probability WC Evidence radio
AC 40.1333350824 1.92822192099e-09 0.9999999981 518612503.667
AL 10.5644673228 0.005055382 0.994944618 196.808989398
AM 25.7812709128 2.52154694444e-06 0.9999974785 396580.948318
AP 13.4280658125 0.0012122878 0.9987877122 823.886605911
CE 24.7191563734 4.28846166679e-06 0.9999957115 233182.849525
ES 40.567665947 1.55182686878e-09 0.9999999984 644401781.26
GO 22.588786324 1.24423372754e-05 0.9999875577 80369.751722
MA 17.3075446836 0.000174437 0.999825563 5731.72803942
MS 29.9037339555 3.20986330536e-07 0.999999679 3115396.46359
MT 19.5744050013 5.61626470736e-05 0.9999438374 17804.4285563
PA 31.4296195953 1.49673445309e-07 0.9999998503 6681210.87384
PB 18.9409648861 7.7088261887e-05 0.9999229117 12971.1435601
PI 8.8288917589 0.0119565683 0.9880434317 82.6360378881
RN 8.8191591598 0.0120141936 0.9879858064 82.2348830361
RO 24.1600601847 5.67162001552e-06 0.9999943284 176315.466418
RR 20.058166039 4.4096633465e-05 0.9999559034 22676.468129
SC 30.7721830943 2.07924302228e-07 0.9999997921 4809441.61582
SE 8.7956277831 0.0121546554 0.9878453446 81.2730027198
TO 13.5362503146 0.0011485278 0.9988514722 869.679851625
BA 42.8429750252 4.97469178945e-10 0.9999999995 2010174784.34
MG 55.735515674 7.89199040127e-13 1 1.26710747119e+12
SP 168.97837878 2.0268017352e-37 1 4.93388170453e+36
RJ 82.3116713751 1.33735794708e-18 1 7.47742967531e+17
RS 52.8467317602 3.3456307332e-12 1 298897302106
PE 19.5248749346 5.75708013522e-05 0.9999424292 17368.9162859
PR 42.819329153 5.0338563126e-10 0.9999999995 1986548557.2
TABLE IV. Statistical comparison between the models. We used the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to compare the two
models: WOC (without competition) and WC (with competition). The AIC lets us determine which model is more likely to
describe correctly the data and quantify by calculating the probabilities and an evidence radio. The probability column shows
the likelihood of each model to be the most correctly. The evidence radio is the fraction of Probability WC by Probability
WOC, which means how many times model WC is likely to be correct than model WOC. Here, the AIC was applied in the
logarithm of the data.
9Federal deputies
State ∆ AIC Probability WOC Probability WC Evidence radio
AC 50.1494383861 1.28880680099e-11 1 77591148589.4
AL 101.196392792 1.0604312338e-22 1 9.43012585939e+21
AM 107.771152638 3.96087877268e-24 1 2.524692265e+23
AP 120.857209596 5.70414277247e-27 1 1.75311179942e+26
CE 184.905492905 7.05151410541e-41 1 1.41813514807e+40
ES 202.215834338 1.22854055302e-44 1 8.13973944563e+43
GO 79.8068548356 4.67909285203e-18 1 2.13716639448e+17
MA 224.617775801 1.67830046988e-49 1 5.95840862792e+48
MS 118.603128883 1.76058823276e-26 1 5.67991982108e+25
MT 120.825144982 5.79633035462e-27 1 1.72522947938e+26
PA 141.83521874 1.58808440446e-31 1 6.29689453025e+30
PB 125.232526939 6.39885542365e-28 1 1.56277948757e+27
PI 105.735798465 1.09588023355e-23 1 9.12508474362e+22
RN 103.807827371 2.87353636201e-23 1 3.48003252446e+22
RO 92.3868106145 8.6787858999e-21 1 1.1522348996e+20
RR 83.7990976172 6.35707240879e-19 1 1.57305114005e+18
SC 130.020826581 5.83896996879e-29 1 1.71263083274e+28
SE 72.7348067195 1.60633972519e-16 1 6.22533318649e+15
TO 55.1303103352 1.06808352921e-12 1 936256362587
BA 342.184328822 4.96154688314e-75 1 2.01550045491e+74
MG 777.261043094 1.65923917468e-169 1 6.02685866668e+168
SP 749.737824971 1.57217132373e-163 1 6.36062994474e+162
RJ 901.70236979 1.57695115134e-196 1 6.34135051776e+195
RS 451.109474546 1.10362679252e-98 1 9.06103409936e+97
PE 142.356671451 1.22360590247e-31 1 8.1725660033e+30
PR 334.950626527 1.84669679188e-73 1 5.41507411718e+72
TABLE V. Statistical comparison between the models. We used the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to compare the two
models: WOC (without competition) and WCB (with competition). The AIC lets us determine which model is more likely to
describe correctly the data and quantify by calculating the probabilities and an evidence radio. The probability column shows
the likelihood of each model to be the most correctly. The evidence radio is the fraction of Probability WC by Probability
WOC, which means how many times model WC is likely to be correct than model WOC.
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States deputies
State ∆ AIC Probability A Probability B Evidence radio
AC 576.061906458 8.12356005108e-126 1 1.23098739187e+125
AL 238.628928458 1.52190160204e-52 1 6.57072703427e+51
AM 682.650418552 5.81226058412e-149 1 1.72050097467e+148
AP 358.738756255 1.26144655989e-78 1 7.92740677087e+77
CE 420.054263752 6.11470593755e-92 1 1.63540162064e+91
ES 480.640448515 4.26827816914e-105 1 2.34286510947e+104
GO 989.587809594 1.29938385781e-215 1 7.69595523285e+214
MA 519.730902297 1.38633608904e-113 1 7.21325808299e+112
MS 439.886900022 3.01837593293e-96 1 3.31303993347e+95
MT 310.209118004 4.35457632874e-68 1 2.29643465749e+67
PA 685.433108646 1.44574467234e-149 1 6.9168506662e+148
PB 400.461973128 1.09846804884e-87 1 9.10358750133e+86
PI 189.012621263 9.0454627114e-42 1 1.10552664016e+41
RN 249.978331952 5.2226980642e-55 1 1.91471915035e+54
RO 482.146906385 2.00969219136e-105 1 4.97588637852e+104
RR 370.038828903 4.4369982636e-81 1 2.25377595525e+80
SC 462.924309949 3.00098154818e-101 1 3.33224308096e+100
SE 139.093088068 6.2563306112e-31 1 1.59838100341e+30
TO 282.919902956 3.67048676832e-62 1 2.72443428656e+61
BA 642.920743716 2.46339667887e-140 1 4.0594355289e+139
MG 1450.44716375 1.09496501832e-315 1 inf
SP 2129.42600533 0 1 inf
RJ 1694.58149782 0 1 inf
RS 618.918508849 4.01377875167e-135 1 2.49141784306e+134
PE 369.31393498 6.37526107172e-81 1 1.56856321451e+80
PR 784.782590509 3.8603414867e-171 1 2.59044440354e+170
TABLE VI. Statistical comparison between the models. We used the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to compare the two
models: WC (without competition) and WOC (with competition). The AIC lets us determine which model is more likely to
describe correctly the data and quantify by calculating the probabilities and an evidence radio. The probability column shows
the likelihood of each model to be the most correctly. The evidence radio is the fraction of Probability WC by Probability
WOC, which means how many times model WC is likely to be correct than model WOC.
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FIG. S1. Modeling the nonlinear scaling for state deputies in all federal states. We show how the model fits the
data of state deputies election for all states in alphabetic order (AC: Acre, AL: Alagoas, AM: Amazonas, AP: Amapa´, BA:
Bahia, CE: Ceara´, ES: Esp´ırito Santo, GO: Goia´s, MA: Maranha˜o, MG: Minas Gerais, MS: Mato Grosso do Sul, MT: Mato
Grosso, PA: Para´, PB: Para´ıba, PE: Pernambuco, PI: Piau´ı, PR: Parana´, RJ: Rio de Janeiro, RN: Rio Grande do Norte, RO:
Rondoˆnia, RR: Roraima:, RS: Rio Grande do Sul, SC: Santa Catarina, SE: Sergipe, SP: Sa˜o Paulo, TO: Tocantis). Each gray
circle represents the data for one candidate and the red line is the result of the analytical model. We see that the model shows
a good agreement with the average behavior for all states.
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FIG. S2. Modeling the nonlinear scaling for federal deputies in all federal states. We show how the model fits the
data of federal deputies election for all states in alphabetic order (AC: Acre, AL: Alagoas, AM: Amazonas, AP: Amapa´, BA:
Bahia, CE: Ceara´, ES: Esp´ırito Santo, GO: Goia´s, MA: Maranha˜o, MG: Minas Gerais, MS: Mato Grosso do Sul, MT: Mato
Grosso, PA: Para´, PB: Para´ıba, PE: Pernambuco, PI: Piau´ı, PR: Parana´, RJ: Rio de Janeiro, RN: Rio Grande do Norte, RO:
Rondoˆnia, RR: Roraima:, RS: Rio Grande do Sul, SC: Santa Catarina, SE: Sergipe, SP: Sa˜o Paulo, TO: Tocantis). Each gray
circle represents the data for one candidate and the red line is the result of the analytical model. We see that the model shows
a good agreement with the average behavior for all states.
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FIG. S3. Simulation on a random network model. Here we compare the analytical solution (black line) with the simulation
on a random Erdo¨s–Re´nyi network for the 2014 Esp´ırito Santo state election of federal deputies (A) and state deputies (B).
Here, each gray circle represents the data for one candidate. We used three different values of average connectivity: 〈k〉 = 2
(black diamonds), 〈k〉 = 6 (blue squares) and 〈k〉 = 10 (red circles). Each symbol is the result of a logarithmic binning for the
money (m) axis over the simulation. We see that as we increase the average network degree, the simulation presents better
agreement with the analytical solution. However, the analytical solution seems to capture the overall behavior for all networks
tested. The apparent disagreement for 〈k〉 = 2 is a consequence of a smaller effective size of the network, since an important
fraction of nodes are not connected with the largest cluster.
FIG. S4. Dependence with ∆m. The solution of the mean field model enables us to calculate the turnout radio T as
a function of the dimensionless n∆m/M parameter. In (A) we compare the turnout for the linear case where we excluded
the competition between the candidates, Tlinear, with the case with competition, T . The competition creates an exponential
saturation, which increases the waste of money when candidates seek new voters. By looking at the difference Tlinear − T ,
we can see that this inefficiency is maximum when n∆m/M = 1.0. In (B) we show that as we decrease ∆m the values of
v(m) usually increases, as expected by the definition of ∆m. However, there is a point where a saturation appears as the total
number of votes starts to get close to the size of the system, resulting on a diseconomy of scale due to the competition between
candidates.
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FIG. S5. Comparison between the actual distribution of votes with the ones obtained by our model. Here, we
show the comparison for the states of (a) Rio de Janeiro and (b) Minas Gerais. Again, the good agreement indicates that the
long tail of P (v) is a direct consequence of the money as an input for the dynamical process.
101 103 105 107
m
100
102
104
106
v
SP election data
Model
102 103 104 105 106
average   v
102
103
104
105
106
107
σ
SP
RJ
MG
BA
RS
PA
PE
CE
a b
FIG. S6. Test of statistical dispersion. It is widely known that the exponential distribution have the property that its
mean and standard deviation are equal. Therefore we use this property in order to test if the dispersion along the mean follows
an exponential distribution, as predicted by the MaxEnt hypothesis. In (a) we see that for state deputies of the eight largest
states in 2014 election the data is in close agreement with σ = 〈v〉 (dashed line). (b) of votes calculate by our model to generate
a random election. Here we show for the state of Sa˜o Paulo that when we add random noise to our model (squares), we obtain
a cloud that closely resembles the actual data (circles).
